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Abstract A computational architecture modeling the
relation between perception and action is proposed. Basic
brain processes representing synaptic plasticity are first
abstracted through asynchronous communication proto-
cols and implemented as virtual microcircuits. These are
used in turn to build mesoscale circuits embodying par-
allel cognitive processes. Encoding these circuits into
symbolic expressions gives finally rise to neuro-inspired
programs that are compiled into pseudo-code to be
interpreted by a virtual machine. Quantitative evaluation
measures are given by the modification of synapse
weights over time. This approach is illustrated by models
of simple forms of behaviors exhibiting cognition up to
the third level of animal awareness. As a potential benefit,
symbolic models of emergent psychological mechanisms
could lead to the discovery of the learning processes
involved in the development of cognition. The exe-
cutable specifications of an experimental platform allow-
ing for the reproduction of simulated experiments are
given in ‘‘Appendix’’.
Keywords Cognitive architecture  Cognitive
development  Symbolic model  Learning processes 
Neural dynamics  Asynchronous communications 
Virtual machine
Introduction
Necessity of a multilevel approach to cognition
From a functional perspective, the brain can be seen as a
kind of computing machine relating input and output in a
significant manner defining behaviors. Yet no basic
instruction set is known for the brain, nor is any kind of
addressable repository of instructions and data, which
together would allow for defining this relation in a formal
way. This machine obviously does not work as traditional
computers, whose design still follows the concepts intro-
duced by von Neumann in the 1940’s i.e., it does not
involve a stored program acting on stored data. Interest-
ingly enough, the usual way to simulate a brain today still
follows pioneering work dating back from about the same
time i.e., that of McCulloch and Pitts (1943) defining finite-
state automata that implement a threshold logic, Hodgkin
and Huxley (1952) using differential equations to simulate
the electrical processes surrounding neurons, and Rall
(1964) taking into account the dendritic trees to define
neuronal input–output relations. In these approaches, the
brain is considered solely as a physical substrate. By
analogy, this would amount to restricting the study of a
computer to the description of its electronic circuits, or
hardware, ignoring its software level that expresses algo-
rithms under the form of programs. Similarly to the way
algorithms running on a computer do represent computa-
tion, one may then ask: could symbolic programs intended
to represent cognition be implemented on top of a simu-
lated brain substrate?
In a similar perspective, the ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘how’’ of
cognitive science can be described using the historical ‘‘tri-
level’’ hypothesis (Marr 1982) that distinguishes compu-
tational, algorithmic and implementation levels. According
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to (Poggio 2012), the original work that led to this
hypothesis included first a behavioral level that was
eventually replaced by the computational one (as noted by
this author, this replacement was indeed influential in the
development of computational neuroscience as we have
witnessed it since). This same author further argues that, in
order to discover the representations used by the brain, one
needs to understand ‘‘how an individual organism learns
and evolves them from experience of the natural world’’,
and that ‘‘learning algorithms and their a priori assump-
tions are deeper and more useful than a description of the
details of what is actually learned’’. As a consequence,
evolution and learning should be added to the list of levels
in cognitive studies.
Analogous conclusions about the necessity of a behav-
ioral learning dimension in cognition can be found in the
insightful review of van der Velde and de Kamps (2015),
who argue that cognitive processes are executed in con-
nection structures that link sensory circuits (i.e., percep-
tion) with motor (i.e., action). What is needed, they add, is
‘‘a mechanism that shows how the information (synchrony
of activation in this case) can be used by the brain’’. An
argument very much related to this can be found in (For-
stmann and Wagenmakers 2015). According to these
authors, top–down approaches via analytical and/or
abstract mathematical tools such as Bayesian inference
rules (see e.g., Ma and Pouget 2008), and for that matter we
may add the bottom-up approaches of the classical theories
based on artificial neural networks (Kohonen 1982; Hop-
field 1982; Rumelhart and McClelland 1986; for an intro-
duction see, Anderson 1995) as well as methods related to
dynamical systems theory (see e.g., Wright and Bourke
2013; for an introduction, see Vernon 2014), are well
suited for describing computations in Marr’s sense, but
‘‘fail to identify algorithms and underlying circuits’’. What
is then needed, they conclude, is a ‘‘middle-out’’ approach
that can identify plausible structures linking biology and
cognition.
Roadmap towards a ‘‘middle-out’’ approach
Looking at the brain as a computing device linking neural
dynamics to behaviors has led to the emergence of quite a
few related research domains. Whereas computational
neuroscience addresses low level neural mechanisms that
give rise to higher level processes representing computa-
tions, cognitive neuroscience attempts to relate brain and
behavior by linking latent cognitive processes to the neural
mechanisms that generate them (Frank and Badre 2015).
These two disciplines, when taken together, form the
computational cognitive neuroscience (or CCN) paradigm
(O’Reilly and Munakata 2000; Ashby and Helie 2011), in
which artificial neural network models and methods serve
both to specify and to concretize theories (Herd et al.
2013). A cognitive model however doesn’t have to repre-
sent its underlying neuronal processes itself, as the present
approach to CCN does, but could rather adds an interme-
diate explanatory layer between the neuronal and behav-
ioral level (Mulder et al. 2014; Frank 2015), using formal
models to connect findings from neuroscience to the cog-
nitive processes at hand (Forstmann and Wagenmakers
2015). The interface between these various layers could be
described using computer science methods that allow for a
delineation and implementation of successive levels of
complexity.
Among the concepts that could be applied towards this
goal, two are of particular relevance, namely concurrent
communicating systems, on one hand, and virtual machi-
nes, on the other. The notion of a concurrent communi-
cating system, which can be used to model the interaction
of objects obeying various communication protocols,
reflects a high level view of a network of interactive neu-
rons. The concept of a virtual machine interpreting a
compiled code that differs from a processor’s native code
constitutes the key mechanism that allows for interfacing
high level abstract objects i.e., software, with their low
level physical support i.e., hardware. Following classical
results of computer science, symbolic expressions that have
been compiled and then interpreted by a virtual machine
get their operational semantics from the transitions they
induce on the state of this machine. In the context of a
multi-level model of brain structures and processes, this
means that low levels physiological details could be
ignored, and grounded models of cognition be formulated
by relating input and output (i.e., perception and behavior)
at a symbolic level.
Yet, we still don’t know what a neural code for relating
perception and behavior might be, and how to discover it.
A possible way towards designing and/or guessing such a
code is to explore the emergence of cognition in animals
and then to try and reproduce it in computational terms, an
idea somehow related to the ideas put forward by Badre
et al. (2015) in their proposed birectional interaction
between animal and human studies. In order to follow a
smooth pattern of evolution leading to human behavior,
models should be developed in progressive steps starting
with the simplest of animal behaviors. Towards this end,
experimental results from comparative zoology could be
used to identify invariant fundamental traits of animal
cognition (Pepperberg and Lynn 2000). In parallel,
advances in the neuroscience (Gerstner and Kistler 2002)
should allow to abstract functionalities of synaptic plas-
ticity into neurally plausible microcircuits. These could be
used in turn to build mesoscale circuits (Badre et al. 2015)
corresponding to neural assemblies supporting the basic
cognitive functions just identified. These circuits would
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then constitute the building blocks of perception (Perin
et al. 2011).
This is the path that we have followed. A new simula-
tion framework along the lines just sketched above is
proposed: as computer applications can be first pro-
grammed, then compiled and finally interpreted by a virtual
machine running as a native program, animal behaviors
will be similarly encoded, compiled and then interpreted by
virtual neurological microcircuits representing a brain’s
innate processes. As a consequence, there will be no ref-
erence to any specific neural network model, but instead a
step-wise refinement of successive virtual machines will
eventually relate actual brain processes to overt behaviors.
In contrast to the usual approach of creating neural models
of interactive brain areas to by quantitatively fitting data
(i.e., where latent estimated parameters are being corre-
lated with neural measures), the goal here is to construct a
generative model of how behaviors can be interfaced with
neural dynamics in order to try and discover the learning
processes involved in the emergence of cognition.
Potential benefits
The potential advantages of such a symbolic computational
framework can be described as follows: while the proposed
formalism constitutes a way of expressing cognitive oper-
ations, and therefore remains a psychological description
rather than a physiological one, it does it by providing a
clear interface between the two domains. More specifically,
and according to a notable attempt in this direction (Jilk
et al. 2008), ‘‘the various levels of description will remain
necessary to explain the full range of phenomena’’. How-
ever, instead of considering the hierarchical arrangement of
multiple neuronal layers such as the hierarchy of visual
cortical layers V1 ? V2 ? V4 ? IT ? …, as neurosci-
entists usually do, this is to be understood in the sense of a
hierarchy of model entities such as cell(or neuron) ? cell
assemblies ? cognitive states ? behavior ? …. In par-
ticular, while the idea of a synchronous activation of brain
processes (Singer 1993) is generally accepted when it
comes to describe the functioning of the cortex, it is
questionable whether the same hypothesis applies to the
cognitive level (Eliasmith 2013), for instance to solve the
binding problem (Feldman 2013) that arises when trying to
link perception and behavior. Actually, a counterview has
been recently advocated by Zeki (2015), which suggests
that ‘‘there is no central neural clock in the (visual) brain
that synchronizes the activity of different processing sys-
tems’’, and that more likely ‘‘activity in each of the parallel
processing-perceptual systems of the visual brain is reset
independently, making of the brain a massively asyn-
chronous organ’’. Concretely then, the results of activities
in the different processing-perceptual systems might not be
bound by physiological interactions between cells in the
specialized visual areas, but post-perceptually and asyn-
chronously, outside the visual brain. In other words, if there
is no doubt that at the physiological level e.g., in the cortex,
the activity is widely synchronous, the description of the
cognitive operations taking place at the psychological
level, and more precisely their link with the underlying
concrete neural circuitry, could be asynchronously driven.
Again, as noted above, symbolic models of such mecha-
nisms could lead to the discovery of the learning processes
involved in the development of cognition. To support this
hypothesis, our own work does rely on a bidirectional, or
interactive, approach (see e.g., O’Reilly and Munakata
2000), where bottom-up (i.e., working from biological facts
up to cognition) and top–down (i.e., working from cogni-
tion constraints down to biological facts) processes interact
in coordination, in our case through asynchronous
communications.
As a final word of introduction, let us stress here the
exploratory nature of this work, which by no means rep-
resents a truthful modeling of the brain, and as such does
not constitute a definite and mature alternative to some of
the more ambitious projects currently underway (de Garis
et al. 2010). The results that are reported here can be
summarized as providing
• a simulation of a functional model of a brain as a
symbolic virtual machine
• a graphical formalism whose repetitive patterns could
be identified as its neural circuits
• an experimental platform that allows for reproducing
these simulations.
The whole approach is illustrated in the ‘‘Results’’ with
examples of simulated behaviors exhibiting cognition up to
the third level of animal awareness (Pepperberg and Lynn
2000). More complex models including a simple form of
meta-cognition (Fleming et al. 2012; Templer and Hamp-
ton 2012) as well as the learning of transitive relations via a
form of analogical reasoning (Gentner and Forbus 2011)
will be found in a companion paper.
Materials and methods
Our overall methodology can be described in the following
terms:
(a) mesoscale circuits (which correspond to basic cog-
nitive processes produced by evolution) must be first
induced from observed behaviors in comparative
zoology
(b) these mesoscale circuits are then compiled into
virtual code to be interpreted by a virtual machine
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running on top of microcircuits implementing
synaptic plasticity (or more precisely, by a virtual
machine executing virtual code designed to imple-
ment synaptic plasticity
(c) by definition, such a virtual machine constitutes an
interface which allows for defining mesoscale
circuits independently of the way the underlying
layers i.e., the microcircuits, are actually imple-
mented. Mesoscale circuits thus somehow corre-
spond to cognitive software running on top of a
biological substrate.
Circuits stand for cell assemblies (Hebb 1949; Palm 1982).
These assemblies constitute a theoretical framework, which
in some of its extensions (see e.g., Knoblauch et al. 2005;
Wennekers and Palm 2009; Huyck and Passmore 2013)
offers functional explanations of phenomena by linking
them to physiological processes. Virtual machines, which
in broad terms emulate the execution of a program in
language S on a system having its own language L, simi-
larly allow for interfacing two domains. To be more pre-
cise, the concept of a virtual machine that we use here (i.e.,
as it is usually understood in theoretical computer science,
as opposed to a more general concept pertaining to the
sharing of resources in operating systems) allows for
interpreting virtual object code L compiled from source
code S, as in the case of the Java virtual machine inter-
preting Java byte code obtained from the compilation of
Java source code. On one side, symbolic expressions s [ S
will represent virtual circuits that correspond to invariant
fundamental traits of animal cognition. On the other side,
logical implications l [ L compiled from these symbolic
expressions will be used to deduce virtual machine
instructions implementing neural dynamics. We follow a
bidirectional approach and present in turn the bottom up
design of virtual circuits followed by the top down con-
struction of a virtual machine.
Bottom up design of virtual circuits
Our bottom up design of virtual circuits follows from
experimental results relating simple animal behavior to
actual neuronal activity. As a general evolution principle,
organisms tend to devise and use ‘‘tricks’’ for their sur-
vival. The ability to evaluate a threat by learning predictive
relationships e.g., by associating a noise and the presence
of a predator, is an example of such tricks realized by
classical conditioning, as illustrated below with the
defensive reflex of aplysia (Kandel and Tauc 1965). The
ability to assess and to remember the consequences of
one’s own actions is another example of an associative
learning providing survival advantages. In this case, op-
erant conditioning (Skinner 1950) associates an action and
its result, which can be positive or negative. Toward this
goal, the organism will first receive either an excite or an
inhibit feedback stimulus, corresponding for instance to a
reward or punishment, respectively; it will then associate
this feedback with an appropriate action, let say accept or
reject a perceived item.
A case of classical conditioning
Let us first consider an example of classical conditioning,
where a light tactile conditioned stimulus cs elicits a weak
defensive reflex and a strong noxious unconditioned stim-
ulus us produces a massive withdrawal reflex. After a few
pairings of stimuli cs and us, where cs slightly precedes
us, a stimulus cs alone will trigger a significantly
enhanced withdrawal reflex i.e., the organism has learned a
new behavior. This can be represented by a wiring dia-
gram, or virtual circuit (Fig. 1), adapted from Carew et al.
(1981) to allow for a one to one correspondence with
symbolic expressions.
In Fig. 1, the components sense(us) and sen-
se(cs) are coupled with sensors (not shown here) cap-
turing external stimuli us and cs and correspond to
sensory neurons. The components motor(us) and mo-
tor(cs) are coupled with action effectors (also not
shown) and correspond to motor neurons. Finally, the
component ltp embodies the mechanism of long term
potentiation and acts as a facilitatory interneuron rein-
forcing the pathway (i.e. augmenting its weight) between
sense(cs) and motor(cs). The interaction of these
components are represented by the iconic symbols -[=[-
and/|\ that correspond to a synaptic transmission (i.e., -
[=[- represents a synapse) and to the modulation of a
synapse, respectively. The symbols * and ? stand for
conjunctive and disjunctive operators (i.e., they are used to
represent the convergence of incoming signals and the
dissemination of an outgoing signal, respectively). Classi-
cal conditioning then follows from the application of a
hebbian learning principle i.e., ‘‘neurons that fire together
wire together’’ (Hebb 1949; Gerstner and Kistler 2002).
Though it is admitted today that classical conditioning
in aplysia is mediated by multiple neuronal mechanisms
(Glanzman 1995; Antonov et al. 2003) including a post-
synaptic retroaction on a presynaptic site, the important
issue is that the learning of a new behavior requires a
sense(cs)-*->=>-motor(cs)
   /|\
   ltp
    |
sense(us)-+->=>-motor(us)
Fig. 1 A virtual circuit implementing classical conditioning
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conjoint activity of multiple neurons. This activity in turn
depends critically on the temporal pairing of the condi-
tioned and unconditioned stimuli cs and us, which in
conclusion leads to implement the ltp component as a
detector of coincidence.
A simple case of operant conditioning
Let us now consider a simple thought experiment where a
pigeon is probing food, e.g., is learning to discriminate
between items such grains and pebbles. Let us assume that
for each item he perceives, his external visual stimuli
consist of a vector I = [I1,I2,.] of primitive features
(e.g., vectors [mat,smooth] and [shiny,smooth]
could correspond to grains and pebbles, respectively). The
generic circuit given in Fig. 2, where I stands as a
parameter, represents the wiring of four components
sense(I), learn(accept(I)), accept(I) and
reject(I), together with two ltp and two opposite
ltd (for long term depression) components. In addition to
the external stimuli captured by component sense(I),
this circuit incorporates the two internal stimuli ex-
cite(accept(I)) and inhibit(accept(I)) that
correspond to feedbacks from probing the food according
to a set of accept elements.
This generic circuit will give rise to an instantiated
circuit for each possible vector I. At the beginning of the
simulation, and for any I, the pathway from sense(I) to
learn(accept(I)) is open, while the pathways to
both accept(I) and reject(I) are closed. After a
few trials, the pigeon will no longer probe his food, i.e., he
will have learned to close the pathway to learn(ac-
cept(I)) and to open either accept(I) or re-
ject(I), associating thus each input vector I with an
action. With regard to the hypothetical neurological sub-
strate corresponding to this scheme, let us just mention that
this process matches some recent results from neuro-
science, where emergent pictures of the brain are based on
the existence of
• two eligibility traces with different temporal profiles:
one corresponding to the induction of ltp, and the
other to the induction of ltd (Huertas et al. 2014;
He et al. 2015)
• two populations of neurons that have opposing spiking
patterns in anticipation of movement suggesting that
these reflect neural ensembles engaged in a competition
(Zagha et al. 2015)
• a fundamental principle in circuit neuroscience accord-
ing to which inhibition in neuronal networks during
baseline conditions allows in turn for disinhibition,
which then stands as a key mechanism for circuit
plasticity, learning, and memory retrieval (Letzkus
et al. 2015).
As a remark that will apply to all models introduced below
(thus illustrating our methodology), each of the compo-
nents contained in this generic model does represent neural
assemblies whose detailed structures should be in turn
modeled by a step-wise refinement of successive virtual
machines eventually relating actual brain processes to overt
behaviors.
Representing circuits by symbolic expressions
The basic entities of the proposed formalism for repre-
senting circuits are constituted by threads. In Computer
science, a thread is a sequence of instructions that executes
concurrently with other threads, may coexist with other
threads to form a process and share resources such as
memory. In the present context, a thread corresponds to a
single or a group of neurons and will be represented by a
symbolic expression enclosing an instruction tree (see
-----  
     |  
     | 
I))-- 
(I))- 
     | 
     | 
-----  
---*->=>-accept(I)
| /|\
| LTP
| |
| +------------------------------------
| |
| LTD
| \|/ |excite(accept(
sense(I)-+---*->=>-learn(accept(I))|
| /|\ |inhibit(accept
| LTD
| |
| +------------------------------------
| |
| LTP
| \|/
---*->=>-reject(I)
Fig. 2 A generic virtual circuit
implementing simple operant
conditioning
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below for the definition of the corresponding formal lan-
guage S). Threads are communicating entities. Each com-
munication does involve a pair of threads and entails on
one side the signal transmitted by a pre-synaptic (source)
thread, and on the other side its reception, via a given
synapse, by a post-synaptic (recipient) thread. Similarly to
a neuron, a thread can be both a source and a recipient and
functions as a gate receiving incoming signals from dif-
ferent sources and sending an outgoing signal to possibly
many recipients. There are however two essential differ-
ences between threads and neurons that allow for a single
thread to represent a group of neurons i.e.,
• contrary to a neuron that alternates roles in cycles, a
thread can be simultaneously a source and a recipient
by maintaining parallel communications.
• contrary to traditional neuron models in which incom-
ing signals are summed in some way into an integrated
value, thread inputs can be processed individually.
Threads can be grouped into disjoint sets, or fibers, to
model neural assemblies, and discrete weights (e.g., integer
numbers) can be attached to pairs of communicating
threads belonging to the same fiber. In some sense, fibers
correspond to the formal notion of independent processes
made of concurrent threads. The interaction of threads
obeys various communication protocols. These protocols
will be implemented by means of procedures that operate
in pairs. As an example, the protocol depicted by the
symbol -[=[- corresponding to a synaptic transmission is
implemented by a send/receive pair, and the symbol
/|\ corresponding to the modulation of a synapse is
implemented by a join/merge pair. A thread named
Thread will be represented by a symbolic expression
having the format thread(Thread,Tree), where
Tree is an instruction tree. Similarly, a named fiber in a
named model will be represented by an expression
threads(Model(Fiber):List), where List is a
list of thread expressions. As an example, the circuit in
Fig. 1 gives rise to the fiber expression given in Fig. 3.
In this simple example, the instruction tree associated
with each thread reduces to a sequence (or linear list) of
virtual instructions such as fire, send, merge, etc. As
another example illustrated in Fig. 2, an instruction tree
can contain an alternative (e.g., as in the thread try that
has two branches commanded by a guard). Formally,
symbolic expressions representing instruction trees belong
to a language S whose syntax is defined by the production
rules given in Fig. 4.
Whereas the non-terminal symbol\guard[ represents
conditions derived from internal stimuli (e.g., as a result of
neurotransmitters), \instruction[ stands for virtual
machine instructions such as fire, send, merge, etc. (see
the ‘‘Appendix’’ for a definition of this instruction set).
This language S of instruction trees is not to be confused
with the language L that will be used to define virtual code
implications (and more generally the state of a virtual
machine, see ‘‘Top down construction of a virtual
machine’’ section) into which instruction trees will be then
compiled, as illustrated below.
Compiling instruction trees into virtual code implications
Virtual code implications are compiled from thread
expressions and have the following
Guard =[ T:Instruction
where Instruction is a virtual machine instruction and T its
clock time. As an example, let us consider the thread
sense(us) in Fig. 3:
 thread(sense(us),
[fire(ltp(sense(cs),motor(cs))),
send(motor(us))]
The straightforward virtual code implications compiled
from this thread are:
 threads(aplysia(reflex)):
 [thread(sense(us),
[fire(ltp(sense(cs),motor(cs))),
send(motor(us))]),
thread(sense(cs),
[merge(ltp(sense(cs),motor(cs))),
send(motor(cs))]),
thread(motor(us),
[receive(sense(us)),
effector(motor(us))]),
thread(motor(cs),
[receive(sense(cs)),
 effector(motor(cs))]),
thread(ltp(Q,R),
[join(Q),
 increment(weight(Q,R))])].
Fig. 3 Fiber expression corresponding to the virtual circuit for
classical conditioning
<tree>    ::=   [] || <sequence> || [<alternative>] 
<sequence>   ::=   [<instruction>|<tree>] 
<alternative>   ::=   <branch> ||  (<branch>;<alternative>) 
<branch>   ::=   (<guard>|<tree>)
Fig. 4 Production rules for
instruction trees
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true => 1:fire(ltp(sense(cs),motor(cs))) 
true => 2:send(motor(us)) 
true => 3:end
In this simple example, successive clock time values
(i.e., 1, 2, 3) correspond to a linear list traversal. As another
example, the thread learn(accept(I)) from Fig. 2,
whose instruction tree contains an alternative giving rise to
the following expression
will be compiled into the following virtual code implica-
tions, whose repetitive successive clock values correspond
to possible descends into a tree:
Generally speaking, the compilation of virtual code
implications can follow from a recursive descent into an
instruction tree (see ‘‘Formal specifications’’ sections).
Top down construction of a virtual machine
Let us consider a set of fibers together with sets of initial
weights for pairs of communicating threads within fibers
and sets of accept elements in fibers. A fiber containing at
least one active thread i.e., a thread whose associated clock
is up and running, constitutes a stream. The virtual
machine consists of
• a set of registers comprising, for each active thread, a
local clock and four internal stimuli registers (i.e., fetch,
catch, excite, inhibit) holding one value at a time
• a set of local signal queues attached to active threads
and holding multiple values at a time
• a content addressable memory holding the virtual code
implications attached to threads, as well as the sets of
current weights and accept elements.
Let Model designate the state of the virtual machine as
described in a language L. At the top level, the virtual
machine is defined by a run procedure that consists of a
loop whose cycle comprises a sense procedure followed by
a react procedure:
run(Model) 
loop sense(Model) 
          react(Model) 
At the next level below, the sense procedure reflects the
triggering of spike trains directed to sensory neurons. After
possibly capturing an interrupt from sensors directed to a given
stream (which initially can be a fiber i.e., without any active
thread), it updates Model using a transition function input:
if   interrupt(Stream(Input)) 
sense(Model)
then  Model<− input(Model(Stream),Input)
The transition function input first terminates the inter-
rupted stream by clearing all its registers and queues and
then resets the clocks of the sensory threads associated with
sensors.
The react procedure itself consists of a loop calling on
each active thread in any stream to first deduce a virtual
machine instruction and then update Model using a tran-
sition function output:
rn(accept(I)))), 
ept(I)))]); 
rn(accept(I)))), 
thread(learn(accept(I)),
[receive(sense(I)), 
test(accept(I)),
((excite(accept(I))   | [fire(ltd(sense(I),lea
fire(ltp(sense(I),acc
(inhibit(accept(I))   | [fire(ltd(sense(I),lea
fire(ltp(sense(I),reject(I)))]))]),
true    => 1:receive(sense(I)) 
true    => 2:test(accept(I)) 
excite(accept(I)) => 3:fire(ltd(sense(I),learn(accept(I)))) 
excite(accept(I)) => 4:fire(ltp(sense(I),accept(I)))
excite(accept(I)) => 5:end 
inhibit(accept(I)) => 3:fire(ltd(sense(I),learn(accept(I)))) 
inhibit(accept(I)) => 4:fire(ltp(sense(I),reject(I))) 
inhibit(accept(I)) => 5:end
for each  Stream(Thread),T:Instruction, 
such that  ist(Model(Stream)(Thread),(clock(T), T:Instruction)) 
do   Model <−  output(Model(Stream)(Thread), T:Instruction)
react(Model)
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The transition function output corresponds to the exe-
cution of a virtual machine instruction and implements
communication protocols to be specified in the ‘‘Micro-
circuits implementing synaptic plasticity’’ section. T:In-
struction is deduced through contextual deduction (Bonzon
et al. 2000) from virtual code implications that have been
compiled from thread expressions and loaded into memory
(see in ‘‘Computational architecture formal specifications’’
section for formal definitions, including that of the ist
predicate standing for ‘‘is true’’).
Clock register values T, which correspond to program
counters in traditional virtual machines like the Java
machine, are used to deduce, for each active thread, the
next instruction satisfying the guard. Whenever a transi-
tion initiated by a thread succeeds, the thread clock is
advanced and the next instruction is deduced and executed,
and whenever it fails, the current instruction is executed
again i.e., the transition is attempted until it eventually
succeeds. Altogether, this amounts to descending into an
instruction tree, with its local clock time corresponding to
the currently reached depth, as illustrated in the previous
section.
The mechanisms enforced in this virtual machine
provide a solution to the problem of dynamically binding
roles to filler (Hummel and Holyoak 2005). More pre-
cisely, this is achieved via both its sense procedure and
the communication protocols between threads, which
together amount to implementing a systematic asyn-
chrony of firing as described in (Doumas et al. 2008).
This stands in contrast with the usual approach to binding
achieved through synchronized firing across separate but
interconnected areas of the brain (Treisman 1996; Feldman
2013).
Before proceeding to a detailed specification of this
machine, let us briefly summarize its salient features and
their relation to a possible macroscopic view of the brain:
• contrary to traditional stored-program computers, this
machine doesn’t have an instruction register holding
the current instruction being executed after its retrieval
from an addressable memory; by interpreting code
deduced just in time from virtual implications compiled
themselves from thread configurations that are akin to
brain states, the overall architecture of this system
could turn out to be closer to that of a brain.
• virtual code implications are reminiscent of daemons
that run as computer background processes and are
triggered by foreground application software; daemons
were in common use in the early days of the Artificial
Intelligence paradigm, when Neuroscience didn’t yet
provide a neural substrate for models of perception and
cognition (Powers 2015).
• similarly to machine code compiled from application
software, this new kind of daemons is compiled from
thread fibers that are thus akin to cognition software
• finally, as described above, these daemons are triggered
by local deductions within a given stream; global
deductions at the model level (to be introduced below)
will give access, from within any stream, to previously
active threads that will thus achieve the status of a
global memory (see ‘‘Microcircuits implementing
synaptic plasticity’’ sections).
Results
We first report on the neural aspects of this work by pre-
senting microcircuits implementing synaptic plasticity. We
then detail a computational architecture by presenting the
formal specifications of a virtual machine under the form of
enhanced Prolog code. Finally, we include examples of
mesoscale circuit modeling the first three levels of animal
awareness.
Microcircuits implementing synaptic plasticity
As illustrated in ‘‘Materials and methods’’ section, circuits
rely on communication protocols that are pictured in thread
diagrams by iconic symbols representing themselves
microcircuits. These protocols can be defined by means of
procedures that operate in pairs:
• send/receive denoted by the symbols
-[=[- or -\=\-
represent synaptic transmission
• join/merge denoted by
/|\ or \|/
implement long term potentiation/depression (ltp/
ltd)
• push/pull denoted by
-\A[-
model a short term cache memory (stm)
• store/retrieve denoted by
--{P}-
model an associative memory (ltm) based on long term
storage and retrieval (lts/ltr).
These protocols are detailed below together with the
corresponding microcircuits. The definition of the basic
threads implementing these microcircuits is given in the
‘‘Appendix’’.
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Synaptic transmission
The microcircuit implementing a synaptic transmission i.e.,
| |
P-+->=>-Q-+-
| |
can be represented by the following expressions
hread(P, [send(Q),.])t
thread(Q, [receive(P),.]) 
The calls send(Q) and receive(P) correspond to the
transmission of a local signal by a pre-synaptic neuron P fol-
lowed by its reception by a post-synaptic neuron Q and are
used to model local communications within a given stream.
The firing of P is assumed to have occurred earlier e.g., in
reaction to the capture of an external stimulus. These expres-
sions give rise to the communication protocol given in Fig. 5.
This send/receive protocol corresponds to an
asynchronous communication subject to a threshold. It
involves a predefined weight between the sender P and the
receiver Q. This weight can be incremented/decremented
by an ltp/ltd thread. After firing thread Q and sending it
a signal, thread P goes on executing its next instruction. On
the other side, thread Q waits for the reception of a signal
from thread P and proceeds only if the weight between P
and Q stands above a given threshold. In any case no data is
passed between the two threads, and the overall process
just amounts to allowing Q to proceed on behalf (or at the
demand) of P.
Long term potentiation/depression (ltp/ltd)
The join/merge pair is used in conjunction with the
send/receive pair in order to implement the modula-
tion of a synapse. The following microcircuit
implementing ltp gives rise to the protocol given in Fig. 6.
An ltd thread can be similarly implemented by decre-
menting weights. As an example, and according to the
experimental protocol of classical conditioning (cf. Fig. 1),
one must first detect the pairing of the two stimuli cs and
us. Towards this end, sense(us) fires an ltp thread
that in turn calls on a join thread to wait for a signal from
sense(cs). In parallel, sense(cs) calls on a merge
thread to post a signal for ltp and then executes a
send(motor(cs)) command to motor(cs). When
met by sense(cs), thread ltp eventually increments
the weight between sense(cs) and motor(cs).
Short term cache memory (stm)
As introduced in a model for the second level of animal
awareness (Pepperberg and Lynn 2000), cache memory
allows for remembering a location A. This can be repre-
sented by
|
P(A)-<A>-*-Q(A)
|
which gives rise to the protocol in Fig. 7.
Resetting stm(A) means that the previous value of A is
no longer available. Furthermore, broadcasting a path,
which amounts to posting a global signal, means that it can
be received by any thread Q attached to any stream.
Associative long term memory (ltm) based on long term
storage and retrieval (lts/ltr)
According to Pepperberg and Lynn (2000), an organism
having the third level of awareness must be able to recall
properties of actual objects from previous perceptions. This
P:send(Q)=fire thread Q 
+post a local signal for Q
 Q:receive(P)=wait for a local signal from P
   +proceed if weight(P,Q)>0
Fig. 5 Communication protocol for synaptic transmission
:fire thread ltp(Q,R)
tp(Q,R):join(Q)=wait for a local signal from Q
+increment(weight(Q,R))
:merge(ltp(Q,R))=post a local signal for ltp(Q,R)
+send(R)=fire thread R
 +post a local signal for R
 P
 l
 Q
 R:receive(Q)=wait for a local signal from Q
   +proceed if weight(Q,R)>0
Fig. 6 Communication protocol implementing long term potentiation
Q---*->=>-R
 /|\
 ltp
  |
P---+-
(A):push(A)=reset and fire thread stm(A)
tm(A):feed(_)=broadcast a path
P
s
Q(A):pull(A)=wait for a path to stm(A)
Fig. 7 Communication protocol implementing a short term cache
memory
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implies in turn some kind of associative long term memory.
The concept of an associative memory has been studied
from various perspectives (see e.g., Palm 1980). In this
particular context, an associative memory extends the
mechanism of long term potentiation by allowing for two
threads P and Q attached to separate streams (and thus also
possibly active at different times) to be associated in order
to trigger a recall thread R. These two streams will be
linked together via a long term memory ltm(P)thread
embedded in a microcircuit driven by a double communi-
cation protocol depicted by -{P}-.This new protocol
involves two complementary long term storage/retrieval
(lts/ltr) threads that allow for the building of a storage
trace and a later retrieval of previously active threads. This
is well in line with results by Rubin and Fusi (2007)
demonstrating that if the initial memory trace in neurons is
below a certain threshold, then it cannot be retrieved
immediately after the occurrence of the experience that
created the memory. This can be represented by the fol-
lowing microcircuit:
Q-+---*->=>-R 
| /|\
| ltr
| |
P-+---*-{P}-*---
 | /|\
 | lts
 | |
  ---
This microcircuit gives rise to the communication protocol
in Fig. 8.
As a distinctive difference from an ltp(Q,R) thread
(which gets fired by P and waits for a local signal from Q in
order to relate Q and R), an ltr(P,Q,R) thread is fired
by Q and waits for a path to ltm(P) in order to relate Q
and R.
Computational architecture formal specifications
The experimental platform allowing for running a virtual
machine is now described in a top down approach.
Functional signatures
Virtual machines essentially emulate the execution of a
program in language S on a system having its own lan-
guage L. We recall the language S of instruction trees
described in ‘‘Representing circuits by symbolic expres-
sions’’ section. As for the language L, it allows for defining
the state of the virtual machine itself (which we recall
consists of sets of registers and queues together with a
content addressable memory holding compiled virtual code
implications as well as current weights and accept
elements).
Compiling an instruction tree into a set of virtual code
implications can be represented by a compile function with
the following signature:
compile: S ? L
Compiling and then loading a set of virtual code
implications into a virtual machine leads to define a com-
bined load function (actually the composition of the com-
pile function with an insert function):
load: S.9 (S ? L) 9 L ? L
This function can be easily extended to include loading
the sets of initial weights and accept elements using a
compile function equal to the identity function. Finally, let
I and O be the languages defining input/output sentences
captured by sensors and delivered to effectors, respec-
tively. Running a model on a virtual machine then defines a
run function as follows:
run: I 9 S9 (S ? L) 9 L ? L9 O
Formal specifications
A complete specification of this computational architecture
is given below under the form of Prolog code, which at the
same time provides an effective, even if not really efficient,
implementation.
Language conventions used throughout include:
• identifiers starting with capital letters represent
variables
• expression F(|X) represents a term with an arbitrary
atomic functor F and any number of arguments e.g.,
F(|X) can be unified with p(1), f(a,b), etc.
• the character ‘‘ – ’’ represents a blank variable whose
instantiation is not required.
:fire thread lts(P)
ts(P):store(P)=fire thread ltm(P)
+increment(weight(P,ltm(P)))
tm(P):feed(_)=proceed if weight(P,ltm(P))>0
+broadcast a path
:fire thread ltr(P,Q,R)
+send(R)=fire thread R
 +post a local signal for R
tr(P,Q,R):retrieve(P)=wait for a path to ltm(P)
 +increment(weight(Q,R))
P
l
l
Q
l
R:receive(Q)=wait for a local signal from Q
   +proceed if weight(Q,R)>0
Fig. 8 Communication protocol implementing a long term associa-
tive memory
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This code is enhanced with macro definitions in order to
improve its readability. Some of these language extensions
(e.g., loop, interrupt, if then else, etc.) have an
intuitive meaning and won’t be developed here. The others
do represent an implementation of the formal notions of a
context and of contextual deduction.
Implementing a context as a dynamic set of elements We
start with the implementation of a context defined as a
dynamic set of elements associated with the following
operations, where each instance plays the role of a non-
logical axiom in a logical theory:
These operations also constitute our implementation of a
content addressable memory as well as that of a queue,
both being considered here as data buffers whose values
can be accessed in any order.
Setting the value of a register in context On this basis, a
register holding one value at a time can be implemented by
a single set operation:
Contextual deduction Given a context, the ist predicate
standing for ‘‘is true in this context’’ is defined as follows:
Compiling virtual code implications The compilation of
virtual code implications follows from a recursive descent
into an instruction tree. According to its signature, the
corresponding function can be implemented as a compile
procedure with one input argument and one output argu-
ment standing for an instruction tree and compiled code,
respectively:
new(C)         :- retractall(instance(C,_)).        clear context C
insert(C,P)    :- assert(instance(C,P)).                insert item P in context C
remove(C,P)    :- retractall(instance(C,P)).        remove item P from context C 
set(C,F(|X))   :- remove(C,F(|_)),            remove value from register F in context C
                  insert(C,F(|X)).               set value |X to register F in context C 
ist(C,true).                                        true is true in any context
ist(C,P)     :- instance(C,P);              P is true in context C if P is an instance  in C
                instance(C,Q=>P),                   or if Q=>P is an instance  in C
                ist(C,Q).                           and Q is true in C
ist(C,(P,Q)) :- ist(C,P),             a conjunction of two propositions is true in context C
                ist(C,Q).                      if both propositions are true in context C
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Loading a model Instead of defining a load procedure
whose arguments reflect the functional signature given
above, let us extend the definition of a model (as intro-
duced in ‘‘Top down construction of a virtual machine’’,
where Model designates a state e L) in order to come up
with a single argument, with Model designating now a state
e S 9 L. Let us then consider a set of fiber assertions as
introduced in ‘‘Representing circuits by symbolic expres-
sions’’ section i.e., expressions of the form
threads(Model(Fiber)):[thread(Thread1,Tree1),..thread
(Threadn,Treen)].
together with global assertions for basic threads imple-
menting synaptic plasticity and memory (see their defini-
tion at the end of the ‘‘Appendix’’), as well as assertions for
initial weights and accept elements. A combined load can
be defined as follows:
compile(Tree,Code) :-                               compile tree
 compileTree(Tree,true,1,Code). 
compileTree([],Guard,T,[Guard => T:end]).           compile tree leaf
compileTree(Sequence,Guard,T,Code) :-               compile tree sequence
 compileSequence(Sequence,Guard,T,Code). 
compileTree([Alternative],Guard,T,Code) :-          compile tree alternative
 compileAlternative(Alternative,Guard,T,Code). 
compileSequence([Instruction|Tree],Guard,T,Code) :- compile sequence
 T1 is T+1, 
 compileInstruction(Instruction,Guard,T,P1), 
 compileTree(Tree,Guard,T1,P2), 
 append(P1,P2,Code). 
compileAlternative(Branch,Guard,T,Code) :-          compile simple alternative
 compileBranch(Branch,Guard,T,Code). 
compileAlternative((Branch;Alternative),Guard,T,Code) :-   compile embedded alternative
 compileBranch(Branch,Guard,T,P1), 
 compileAlternative(Alternative,Guard,T,P2), 
 append(P1,P2,Code). 
compileBranch((Guard1|Tree),Guard2,T,Code) :-       compile branch
 (Guard2=true -> Guard=Guard1; Guard=(Guard1,Guard2)), 
 compileTree(Tree,Guard,T,Code). 
compileInstruction(P(|X),Guard,T,[Guard => T:P(|X)]) :-            compile instruction
 instruction(P). 
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Running a model Let Interrupt, the input sentence cap-
tured by sensors at successive run cycles, be represented by
a list of the form
[sensor(|X1),..sensor(|Xn)] .
The run function is then defined as follows:
The formal specification of the set of virtual machine
instructions is given in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
Examples of mesoscale circuits
We present operational models of simple animal behaviors
that were executed on the experimental platform described
in the previous section. These models offer simulations of
the first three level of animal awareness according to
Pepperberg and Lynn (2000). More complex models
showing how a simple form of meta-cognition, namely
memory awareness (Fleming et al. 2012; Templer and
Hampton 2012), can be reduced to successive layers of
associative memories implementing retrospective revalua-
tion, on one hand, and another model implementing the
learning of transitive relations via analogical inferences
(Hummel and Holyoak 2005), on the other, will be found in
a companion paper.
A model of the first level of animal awareness
Let us consider an example of operant conditioning that
involves a choice between two alternatives. In an experi-
ment (see e.g., Zentall et al. 1981), pigeons are first con-
fronted with a lit sample that can be either red or green, and
clear machine
for each instruction tree
))), contained in model fibers
compile and load
hread),P))))),       virtual code
compile and load
d),P))))),          basic threads
load weights
|X)))), 
load accepts
load(Model):-
new(_),
for_each(thread(Thread,Tree),
from(threads(Model(Fiber
do((compile(Tree,Code),
forall(member(P,Code),insert(Model(Fiber)(T
for_each(thread(Thread,Tree),
from(threads(Model)),
do((compile(Tree,Code),
forall(member(P,Code),insert(Model(_)(Threa
for_each(Weight(Thread1,Thread2)(|X),
from(weights(Model(Fiber))),
do(insert(Model(Fiber),Weight(Thread1,Thread2)(
for_each(Accept(|X),
from(accepts(Model(Fiber))),
do(insert(Model(Fiber),Accept(|X)))).
run(Model)  :- loop((sense(Model),react(Model))).   loop sense and react
sense(Model):- if(interrupt(Stream(Interrupt)),     input interrupt
               then((remove(Model(Stream)(_),clock(|_)),                 clear stream
                     remove(Model(Stream)(_),fetch(|_)), 
                     remove(Model(Stream)(_),catch(|_)), 
                     remove(Model(Stream)(_),excite(|_)), 
                     remove(Model(Stream)(_),inhibit(|_)), 
                     remove(Model(Stream)(_),signal(|_)), 
                     for_each(sensor(|X),           for each sensor
                     such_that(member(sensor(|X),Interrupt)), 
                     do(set(Model(Stream)(sense(|X)),clock(1))))))).  fire sense thread 
react(Model):- for_each((Stream(Thread),T:Instruction),         for each parallel thread 
               such_that(ist(Model(Stream)(Thread), 
                             (clock(T),T:Instruction))),          deduce an instruction
               do(Model(Stream)(Thread).(T:Instruction))).        execute an instruction 
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then must peck one of two lit buttons (say, one left and one
right button). The color of the sample and of each button
varies randomly from one trial to the next, but there is
always one green button and one red button. In order to get
a reward, a pigeon must peck the button that does have (or
doesn’t have, according to the type of the experiment) the
same color as the sample.
According to Wright (2001), there are two different
ways that pigeons can learn matching to sample. Their first
strategy is to associate each configuration (e.g., each
combination of external stimuli) with the corresponding
correct choice. This can be implemented by the circuit
given in Fig. 9 that looks like a simple extension of the
Fig. 2 implementing simple operant conditioning, where
positive feedbacks only are taken into account (in order to
simplify the presentation, the preliminary step involving
the presentation of the sample alone is omitted):
Visual stimuli captured by sensors are represented by
three expressions a(I), b(J), c(K), where a, b, c
correspond to the left button, the right button and the
sample, respectively, and the parameters I, J, K take the
values green or red. In addition to these external
stimuli, two internal stimuli i.e., fetch(a),ex-
cite(peck(a(I),c(K))) and fetch(b),ex-
cite(peck(b(J),c(K))) first command the choice
made by the pigeon (i.e., either ‘‘left’’ or ‘‘right’’, resulting
from a random selection) and then provide a positive
feedback when the choice was correct (i.e., the pigeon got
rewarded). As an example, if the input configuration is
a([green]),b([red]),c([green]) then the cor-
rect choice is fetch(a) leading to peck(a).
Another pigeon strategy to learn this task is as follows:
while first randomly pecking either one of the two buttons,
it does compare them in turn with the sample and learn to
match colors. After a training period, it then stops pecking
randomly and selects the button that does match the
sample. In other words, pigeons do not learn to choose a
color in a given arrangement of colors, but to match and
then choose the match. According to Pepperberg and Lynn
(2000), the first level of animal awareness, corresponds to
the ability to follow a simple rule involving the perception
of a specific item or event and either its acceptation or its
rejection. The second strategy that was just described,
which can be characterized as learning matching/oddity to
sample, does actually constitute an instance of the first
level of awareness. This can be represented by a three layer
circuit (Fig. 10). The middle layer implements the random
pecking of a button. The two outer layers implement
learning to match a button with the sample and eventually
select the match. This overall circuit functions as an
learning automaton that is being trained to accept one of
two objects a and b whose color I and J does match the
color K of the sample c. Note that the pathways to
peck(a) and peck(b) are opened by an ltp thread
initiated by the middle layer whenever a trial ends with a
reward.
A model of the second level of animal awareness
In a nut shell, whereas the first level of animal con-
sciousness does not allow for an immediate transfer to a
similar task, an organism with the second level is aware
enough of a rule to transfer it across situations (Pepperberg
and Lynn 2000). In an experiment reported by (Cole et al.
1982), hummingbirds face the choice of visiting one of two
locations potentially containing food. In order to solve this
dilemma, they are trained to adopt a strategy that effec-
tively relies on remembering the location they visited last.
Along the same lines, it is known that rats do use spe-
cialized neuronal cells (which include head direction,
place and grid cells) to create internal cognitive maps of
their environment, direct themselves and remember places
 ---*->=>-peck(a)
| /|\
| ltp
| |
| +------------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
| ltd  |
| \|/  |fetch(a)|excite(peck(a(I),c(K)))-
sense(a(I),b(J),c(K))-+---*->=>-learn(peck(a(I),b(J),c(K)))|
| /|\  |fetch(b)|excite(peck(b(J),c(K)))-
| ltd  |
| | |
| +------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| ltp
| \|/
---*->=>-peck(b)
Fig. 9 Circuit implementing operant conditioning with a choice
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they have been visiting (see e.g., O’Keefe and Nadel 1978;
Moser et al. 2008). Moreover, recent research indicates that
these capabilities are innate (Langston et al. 2010; Wills
et al. 2010). Let us extrapolate these results to humming-
birds. Each trial in this experiment consists of two separate
stages. In the first (information) stage, an artificial flower
containing food is presented in one of two possible loca-
tions i.e., in a cage left or right corner. After the bird is fed,
the flower is removed. In the second (choice) stage, a
flower is presented in each corner, one flower containing
food and the other one empty. Birds are then allowed to
visit one flower only. If the flower containing food con-
sistently stands in the same corner as in the information
stage, birds are thus required to return to the location they
have just visited with success, which corresponds to adopt
a win/stay lose/shift rule (or strategy).
This experiment gives rise to the following model in
Fig. 11.
This model has the following characteristics:
• an information stage can be initiated by one of two
threads sense(A(I),B([])) and sen-
se(A([]),B(J)), where the parameters A, B denote
for example the left and right corner, the parameters I
and J are the expression flower(food)signaling a
flower with food, and ‘‘[]’’ signals a location without a
flower
• the choice stage is initiated by a thread sen-
se(A(I),B(J)), where I and J can be either one of
two expressions flower(food)and flower([])cor-
responding to the location of a flower with food and
without food, respectively
• these two stages are interconnected via a new interac-
tion protocol denoted by -\A[- or -\B[- allowing
for the short term cache memory (or stm) of location A
or B.
When discussing this experiment, (Pepperberg and Lynn
2000) first note that an organism having a second level of
awareness ‘‘is aware enough of the rule to transfer it across
situations’’ (e.g., across inflorescences). This is reflected in
the above model by parameters A and B allowing for the
representation of various environments. They then add: ‘‘If,
however, the organism were truly aware of using the rule, it
would, when transferred to a win/shift lose/stay paradigm,
readjust after only a few trials’’, which actually they do not.
This is reflected in the model by the fact that implementing
the converse win/shift lose/stay strategy requires to
 ---*->=>-learn(match(a(I),c(K))|excite(match(a(I),c(K)))-
| /|\  |
| ltd  |
| | |
(K))-------+ +-----------------------------------------------------
| |
| ltp  
| \|/  
---*->=>-match(a(K),c(K))-*->=>-peck(a)
 /|\
ltd
|
--------------------------+---------------------------------------
| |
ltd   |
\|/ |fetch(a)|excite(peck(a(I),c(K)))-
(J),c(K))--*->=>-learn(peck(a(I),b(J),c(K)))|
/|\ |fetch(b)|excite(peck(b(J),c(K)))-
ltp |
| |
--------------------------+---------------------------------------
|
ltp
 \|/
---*->=>-match(b(K),c(K))-*->=>-peck(b)
| /|\  
| ltp
| |
sense(a(I),c
sense(a(I),b
sense(b(J),c(K))-------+ +------------------------------------------------------
| | |
| ltd  |
| \|/  |
---*->=>-learn(match(b(J),c(K)))|excite(match(b(J),c(K)))-
Fig. 10 Circuit implementing the first level of animal consciousness
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consider negative inhibit feedbacks instead of the positive
excite used above.
A model of the third level of animal awareness
The third level of animal awareness provides an organism
with the additional capacity to integrate two different sets
of stored information. In order for example to make a
categorical judgment (e.g., to sort items), an organism has
to recall properties of actual objects. This implies in turn
some kind of associative long term memory. This can be
illustrated through an experiment reported in (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1980). In the first phase of this experi-
ment, chimpanzees were familiarized with a set of objects
(such as a cake and an orange, on one hand, and a key and a
stick, on the other) belonging to two categories i.e., edible
and inedible. In a second phase, they were trained to sort a
subset of objects of each kind by placing them in two
different bins. The question that did then arise was to
determine in which of two possible ways they learned this
task i.e., by memorizing an association between each item
and the appropriate bin, or by devising the rule ‘‘this bin is
for items that I eat and the other bin is for items that I do
not eat’’. If such a rule had been be used, then the chim-
panzees could sort more familiar objects of each kind
without additional training. A subsequent test showed that
this was indeed the case.
The two phases of this experiment can be imple-
mented by two independent circuits, possibly active at
different times. These two circuits are linked together by
a double communication protocol depicted by -{P}-
implementing an associative long term memory (or ltm).
This protocol involves two complementary long term
storage/retrieval (lts/ltr) processes that allow for the
building of a thread storage trace and a later retrieval
from this trace. The first phase (Fig. 12), which starts
with the categorization of each variable object X into
edible and inedible items, will end up memorizing
familiar objects as an association {food(X)} or
{toy(X)}.
The second phase (Fig. 13), which leads to sorting
objects into one of two bins denoted A and B, starts with a
recall from familiar objects. As a result of remembering the
category of object X, the sorting process applies to all
familiar objects without additional training.
Running a simulation A simulation run for learning the
category of objects gives rise to the following log, where
inputs from sensors and effector outputs are preceded by a
prompt |: and [, respectively:
sense(A(I),B([]))--<A>-----*-recall(A)->=>-peck(A)
   |
---*->=>-
   |  /|\
   |  ltp
   |   |
   |   +--------------------------------------------------------
   |   | |
   |  ltd |
   |  \|/ |fetch(A)|excite(peck(A(I)))-
 sense(A(I),B(J))-+---*->=>-learn(peck(A(I),B(J)))|   
   |  /|\ |fetch(B)|excite(peck(B(J)))-
   |  ltd |
   |   | |
   |   +--------------------------------------------------------
   |   |
   |  ltp
   |  \|/
---*->=>-
   |
 sense(A([]),B(J))--<B>-----*-recall(B)->=>-peck(B)
Fig. 11 Circuit implementing the second level of animal consciousness
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|:see([sensor(cake)]).                                                    sensor input
excite(food(cake))                                  positive feedback
decrement(weight(sense(cake),learn(food(cake)))):0  adjust weight
increment(weight(sense(cake),food(cake))):1         adjust weight
increment(weight(food(cake),ltm(food(cake)))):1     adjust weight
>>>ltm(food(cake))                                  memorize
|:see([sensor(orange)]).                            sensor input
excite(food(orange))                                positive feedback
decrement(weight(sense(orange),learn(food(orange)))):0                   adjust weight
increment(weight(sense(orange),food(orange))):1     adjust weight
increment(weight(food(orange),ltm(food(orange)))):1 adjust weight
>>>ltm(food(orange))                                memorize
|:see([sensor(stick)]).                             sensor input
inhibit(food(stick))                                negative feedback
decrement(weight(sense(stick),learn(food((stick)):0 adjust weight
increment(weight(sense(stick),toy(stick))):1        adjust weight
increment(weight(toy(stick),ltm(toy(stick)))):1     adjust weight
>>>ltm(toy(stick))                                  memorize
|:see([sensor(key)]).                               sensor input
inhibit(food(key))                                  negative feedback
decrement(weight(sense(key),learn(food(key)))):0    adjust weight
increment(weight(sense(key),toy(key))):1            adjust weight
increment(weight(toy(key),ltm(toy(key)))):1         adjust weight
>>>ltm(toy(key))                                    memorize
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  ---*->=>-food(X)-+---*-{food(X)}
 |  /|\  |  /|\
 |  ltp  |  lts
 |  |   |   |
 |  |   ---
 |  +------------------------------------- 
 |  |      |
 |  ltd     |
 |  \|/  |excite(food(X))--
sense(X)-+---*->=>-learn(food(X))|  
 |  /|\  |inhibit(food(X))-
 |  ltd     |
 |  |      |
 |  +-------------------------------------
 |  |   ---
 |  |   |   |
 |  ltp  |  lts
 |  \|/  |  \|/
  ---*->=>-toy(X)--+---*-{toy(X)}
Fig. 12 Circuit for memorizing
a category
   --*->=>-put(food,A)
 | /|\
 | ltp
 |  |
{food(X)}-----*--  |  +-------------------------------------------------------
|  |  |  | |
| ltr  | ltd   |
| \|/  | \|/   |fetch(A)|excite(put(food,A))-
+--*->=>-recall(food,A,B)-+--*->=>-learn(put(food,A,B))|
|    | /|\   |fetch(B)|excite(put(food,B))-
|    | ltd   |
|    |  | |
|    |  +-------------------------------------------------------
|    |  |
|    | ltp
|    | \|/
|     --*->=>-put(food,A)
sense(X,A,B)-+
|     --*->=>-put(toy,B)
|    | /|\
|    | ltp
|    |  |
|    |  +-----------------------------------------------------
|    |  |    |
|    | ltd      |
|    | \|/   |fetch(a)|excite(put(toy,A))-
+--*->=>-recall(toy,A,B)--+--*->=>-learn(put(toy,A,B))|
| /|\  | /|\   |fetch(b)|excite(put(toy,B))-
| ltr  | ltd      |
|  |  |  |    |
{toy(X)}------*--  |  +-----------------------------------------------------
 |  |
 | ltp
 | \|/
  --*->=>-put(toy,B)
Fig. 13 Circuit for sorting familiar object
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The log of a simulation run for sorting objects is as follows:
Discussion
Comparative approach
A study of some large scale projects (de Garis et al. 2010)
reveals a profound disagreement of how to possibly pro-
gress towards the goal of reverse engineering a brain in
action. While some authors (Markram et al. 2015) report-
ing about the reconstruction and simulation of a neuro-
logical circuitry describe ‘‘the emergence of spontaneous
spatio-temporal patterns’’, some others (Modha et al. 2011)
more cautiously believe that ‘‘the realistic expectation is
not that cognitive function will spontaneously emerge’’
from such simulations, and rather insist that a simulator
supplies a substrate within which we can formulate theories
of neural computation.
As a first example, the Blue Brain project (Markram
2006) proclaimed objective was ‘‘ultimately, to study the
steps involved in the emergence of biological intelli-
gence’’. Towards this end, they did collect vast amounts of
in vitro measurements, and on this basis managed to sim-
ulate the current induced by ion channels. By assembling
individual neurons, they then reconstructed in silico a
neocortical column, i.e., a slice of a rat brain. The inter-
action of interconnected neurons was then expected to
emerge spontaneously, and it did so to a certain extend.
This simulated experiment however had no inputs from
sensory organs, nor any outputs to other parts of the brain,
and as such was not related to any behavior.
SAL, or Synthesis for Leabra and ACT-R (Jilk et al.
2008) was conceived as a merging of two well-established
constituents i.e., ACT-R (Anderson et al. 2004), a symbolic
|:sort(left,right)([sensor(cake,left,right)]).      sensor input
increment(weight(sense(cake,left,right),recall(food,left,right))):1      adjust weight
recall(food,left,right)                             remember
fetch(left)                                         random choice
excite(put(food,left))                              positive feedback
decrement(weight(recall(food,left,right),learn(put(food,left,right))):0  adjust weight
increment(weight(recall(food,left,right),put(food,left))):1              adjust weight
>>>put(food,left)                                   effector output
subject  has been trained in one round to sort familiar object cake according to its category  
|:sort(left,right)([sensor(orange,left,right)]).    sensor input
increment(weight(sense(orange,left,right),recall(food,left,right))):1    adjust weight
recall(food,left,right)                             remember
>>>put(food,left)                                   effector output 
familiar object orange has been sorted according to its category without additional training 
|:sort(left,right)([sensor(stick,left,right)]).     sensor input
increment(weight(sense(stick,left,right),recall(toy,left,right))):1      adjust weight
recall(toy,left,right)                              remember
fetch(left)                                         random choice
inhibit(put(toy,left))                              negative feedback
|:sort(left,right)([sensor(stick,left,right)].      sensor input
recall(toy,left,right)                              remember
fetch(right)                                        random choice
excite(put(toy,right)                               positive feedback
decrement(weight(recall(toy,left,right),learn(put(toy,left,right))):0    adjust weight
increment(weight(recall(toy,left,right),put(toy,right))):1               adjust weight
>>>put(toy,right)                                   effector output 
subject  has been trained in two rounds to sort familiar object  stick according to its category 
|:sort(left,right)([sensor(key,left,right)]).                             sensor input 
increment(weight(sense(key,left,right),recall(toy,left,right))):1        adjust weight
recall(toy,left,right)                              remember
>>>put(toy,right)                                   effector output 
familiar object key  has been sorted according to its category without additional training
|:sort(left,right)([sensor(money)]).                sensor input 
unfamiliar object was not sorted 
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production-rule based architecture, and Leabra (O’Reilly
and Munakata 2000), a neural modeling system. According
to the developers themselves, this integration ‘‘is of the
simplest form, whereby the visual module in an existing
ACT-R model of navigation is replaced with a Leabra
vision model, which is capable of processing raw bitmap
images in a way that the ACT-R visual module was not
capable of doing. Similarly, extant Leabra models are not
capable of organizing problem solving behavior’’. In ACT-
R, operations are purely syntactical without any reference
to the semantic content of their representation. Still, it is at
this level that learning, memory, and action planning take
place. Furthermore, and in accordance with a tradition
going back to the theory of the General Problem Solver
(Newell and Simon 1976), task representation is also
encoded at this level and drives the overall behavior of the
model. As a consequence, the resulting integration cannot
address the issue of how symbolic representations and/or
cognitive functions arise in the brain. This situation is
highly illustrative of the inherent shortcomings of present
symbolic cognitive models and will be confronted below
with our own approach. It is interesting to note here at once
that while Jilk et al. (2008) still hope to map the theories
either mathematically or in simulated form, they readily
add (p. 211) that ‘‘the incommensurable categories at the
various levels of description will remain necessary to
explain the full range of phenomena’’.
Somehow at the other end of the wide spectrum of
possible integrations, the work of Eliasmith (2013) sys-
tematically relates to the semantic content i.e., the infor-
mation that is contained in groups of spiking neurons.
Formally, a set of mathematical methods called NEF (for
Neural Engineering Framework) was designed to allow for
building spiking neural networks that approximate any
nonlinear dynamical system (Eliasmith et al. 2012). The
central idea behind the NEF is that a group of spiking
neurons can represent a vector space over time and that
connections between groups of neurons can compute
functions on those vectors. Semantic pointers that some-
how correspond to an associative memory do realize a
mapping between concept vectors and various known
tasks. But as the authors acknowledge themselves, they do
not provide a mechanism for how brains learn to represent
internal and external states. It is thus unclear how this
approach can end up representing cognitive functions. On
the positive side however, by providing a normalized
interface between this formalism and underlying simulated
physiological processes, they have been able to implement
the principles of the NEF on both the Neurogrid chip
(Choudhary et al. 2012) and the SpiNNaker system (Furber
et al. 2014).
From single neurons to neural assemblies
Since the pioneering work of Hodgkin and Huxley (1952),
the usual approach for simulating neural dynamics starts
with current flows represented by differential equations.
Various proposals have been made to close the gap
between the level of individual neurons and higher levels
supporting behavior. A possible solution is to consider
group of neurons, or neural assemblies. Following a tra-
dition going back to D. Hebb (1949) and further illustrated
by numerous authors (see e.g., Palm 1982; Edelman 1987;
Bienenstock 1994; Knoblauch and Palm 2002; Izhikevich
2006), neural (or Hebbian cell) assemblies can be described
informally as groups of strongly interconnected neurons
that support specific functions (for a review, see Huyck and
Passmore 2013; Pulvermu¨ller et al. 2014). This approach
has already led to the design of artifacts relating behaviors
and brain processes by mapping neural assemblies onto the
topology of brain regions (Seth et al. 2004; Knoblauch
et al. 2005). Their existence is generally viewed as
resulting from Hebbian learning (Gerstner and Kistler
2002). In their simplest form represented by auto-associa-
tive networks, this can lead for example to the creation of
local memories (Palm 1980; Knoblauch et al. 2010). In
latest models, so-called operational cell assemblies allow
for the representation of syntactic patterns which are
implemented in terms of hetero-associative transition
graphs in attractor networks which cause a directed flow of
activity through the neural state space (Wennekers and
Palm 2009). These assemblies are grounded in, and thus
dependent on specific artificial neural network models
defining a particular neural state space. This could become
critical when confronted with new experimental results
(Branco et al. 2010) that have provided a demonstration of
the power of dendrites for solving computational problems
in the brain. More precisely, it has been found that single
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dendrites of cortical pyramidal neurons exhibit sensitivity
to the sequence of synaptic activation, and thus can encode
the temporal sequence of synaptic input. Furthermore,
simulation results (Legenstein ad Maass 2011) have con-
firmed that the branch strength could store a reference to an
input pattern, and that a subsequent pattern presentation
will elicit reliable spiking of the neuron, resulting in the
entire dendritic tree behaving like a network by itself
(Costa and Sjo¨stro¨m 2011).
As an alternative, it is proposed here to model neural
assemblies in a simulation framework driven by a virtual
machine acting as an interface between neural dynamics
and symbolic information defining behaviors. As a conse-
quence, there will be no reference to any specific neural
network model. Whereas in some simulations threads are
equated with individual neurons, in others they do repre-
sent multiple interconnected neurons whose coordinated
activity achieves an aggregated result. Threads thus con-
stitute a general and versatile tool for simulating various
levels of structures and/or processes e.g., Hebbian cell
assemblies.
Proposal characteristics
A common way of characterizing cognitive models is given
by the two competing paradigms of artificial cognitive
architectures (Brooks 1991) i.e., the traditional ‘‘sense-
think-act’’ cycle of cognitivist systems, on one side, and the
simplified ‘‘sense-act’’ cycle of embodied and/or emergent
cognition, on the other. Clearly, as explicit in ‘‘Top down
construction of a virtual machine’’ section, our proposed
model falls into the second category, but it does so by
resorting to a kind of symbolic computational framework
generally associated with the first approach. This can be
related to the hypothesis originally proposed by Newell and
Simon (1976) according to which human intelligence can
be approximated by a physical symbol system (PSS).
According to this hypothesis (see also Nilsson 2007), ‘‘A
physical symbol system is a machine that produces through
time an evolving collection of symbol structures. (..) An
expression designates an object if, given the expression, the
system can either affect the object itself or behave in ways
dependent on the object’’. Concretely, this means that
symbols have to be linked to real objects in two ways i.e.,
through sensors (the objects providing input to the system)
and through effectors (the system acting in return on the
objects). Our proposal somehow achieves this. More pre-
cisely, it is the concatenation of the pathways leading to the
firing of a given thread that allow for the symbols to be
connected to the objects. What distinguishes it however
from previous implementations (e.g., Newell et al. 1989) is
its use of a virtual machine, which constitutes an interface
between the physiological and the psychological levels that
are associated with both sensing and acting.
Coming back to the analysis of Poggio (2012) alluded to
in our Introduction, it is interesting to further confront his
views with the models presented in ‘‘Examples of mesos-
cale circuits’’ section. For instance, he asks ‘‘did intelli-
gence, as the ability to learn, evolve from associative,
Pavlov-like reflexes and memories, with the addition of
(neurally simple) primitive operations such as composition
of different memories?’’ A detailed look at our models
readily reveals that their mesoscale circuits do actually
operate just along the lines imagined by this author, with
iterated applications of an associative long term memory
(ltm) based on long term storage and retrieval (lts/
ltr), as introduced in ‘‘Associative long term memory
(ltm) based on long term storage and retrieval (lts/ltr)’’
section, playing a key role. This whole approach relies on
the direct mapping of perceived invariant structures. This
mechanism reflects in particular the prime importance of
vision as a means of first carving the brain to reflect the
reality of the world, and then act on it in return (Barret
2008).
Potential benefits
Generative models bridging the gap between the physio-
logical and cognitive levels could at the end lead to the
discovery of the learning processes involved in the devel-
opment of cognition. As illustrated in our development of
models of animal awareness, our formalism offers a prin-
cipled guidance towards this goal. More precisely, this is
achieved through a two steps process consisting in
• first inducing plausible mesoscale circuits that represent
the application of rules such as matching/oddity to
sample, win/stay loose/shift, recall/sort, corresponding
to the solution of elementary cognitive tasks such as of
association, cross-modal integration, etc.
• embedding then these circuits in order to solve higher
level tasks such meta-cognition.
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The successful application of this methodology could
lead to a reconsideration of the whole concept of a ‘‘neural
code’’ allowing for relating perception and behavior. Such
a neural code may well reside in the spatial arrangement of
mesoscale circuit patterns (i.e., a kind of population or
sparse coding, as opposed to the more traditional rate or
temporal coding associated with spike trains). One might
then even consider that there is actually no code at all (in
the sense of a specific arrangement always associating the
same response to a given stimulus), and that ‘‘the code is
the overall structure itself’’. More precisely, perception
might be related to behaviors through the paths found by
evolution via iterated hebbian learning.
Another potential benefit of this formalism resides in the
insight it offers in support of the recent suggestion that ‘‘the
operations of the brain are massively asynchronous with
respect to each other’’. (Zeki 2015). More precisely, as
introduced in ‘‘Top down construction of a virtual
machine’’ section and formalized in ‘‘Computational
architecture formal specifications’’ section, the basic idea
here is that there is no central clock in the brain that syn-
chronizes parallel processing systems (i.e., they do have
their own local clock), with the activity in each of these
systems being reset independently, thus ‘‘making of the
brain a massively asynchronous organ’’.
These assumptions bear strong analogies with the
SpiNNaker project (Furber et al. 2014), whose massively
parallel computer architecture is inspired by the connec-
tivity of the brain. Indeed, similarly to the tree structure of
threads that can be interpreted sequentially and determin-
istically, the SpiNNaker system can impose deterministic
operations in order to match a conventional sequential
model under certain condition. More specifically, whereas
threads maintain parallel asynchronous communications
whose incoming signals are processed individually, the
SpiNNaker architecture allows for the transmission of a
large number of small data packets obeying a communi-
cation protocol according to which
• neurons communicate through action potentials, or
‘‘spikes’’ i.e., asynchronous impulses whose height and
width are largely invariant; consequently, information
is conveyed only in the identity of the neuron that
spiked and the time at which it spiked
• the information flow in a network can be represented as
a time series of neural identifiers; this allows for the
encoding of neural activity through the so-called
address event representation (AER) information proto-
col (Boahen 2000).
As a result of these common assumptions, virtual
machines interpreting threads could function as an inter-
face allowing for spatio-temporal sequences of spiking
neurons to be related to behaviors. In other words, this
means that this new simulation tool could be used to
simulate both the interface between cell assemblies and the
neural level, on one hand, and that between cell assemblies
and cognition, on the other.
Open perspectives
Although our simulation framework must be clearly dis-
tinguished from a real brain, it readily offers a macroscopic
picture of how brain processes may lead to cognition.
Among the many theories we could confront this frame-
work with, we shall concentrate on Edelman’s theory of
neural Darwinism (Edelman 1987). The main concept
underlying its developments is the so-called group selec-
tion of population. A first selection process occurring epi-
genetically during prenatal development leads to a primary
repertoire representing the diversity of anatomical con-
nectivity. A subsequent selective process coupled with the
subject’s activity results in a second repertoire based on
modifications in the strength of synaptic connections
reflecting their correlation with signals arising from
behavior. Finally, reentrant processes ‘‘based on the exis-
tence of reciprocally neural maps’’ help to ‘‘maintain spa-
tiotemporal continuity in response to real-world
interactions’’. Although statistical aspects associated with
the idea of reentrant processes have led to the development
of various artifacts or robots, this highly abstract concept
has proved to be difficult to map into more traditional ideas
and experimental results. The neurobiological phenomena
accounting for them have thus never been observed. It is
interesting to note that, in the mind of the author, their
existence ‘‘obviates the need for explicit exchange of time
and place markers of the kind required in parallel com-
puting systems’’. In other words, they appear to be a sub-
stitution for, or play the role of, the explicit concurrent
communicative processes we did strive for in the present
article. While the modification of synaptic efficiency
associated with the creation of secondary repertoires pre-
sumably relies on ltp/ltd processes, we put forward the
hypothesis that our proposed complementary lts/ltr
348 Cogn Neurodyn (2017) 11:327–353
123
processes play a similar role for reentry. In support of this
thesis, let us simply confront Edelman (1987) own words:
‘‘One of the fundamental tasks of the nervous system is to
carry on adaptive perceptual categorization (..). A neces-
sary condition for such perceptual categorization is
assumed to be reentry’’ with the very fact that lts/ltr
associative processes were introduced in ‘‘Results’’ in order
to implement the concept of a category.
To touch on another, more focused domain of research
i.e., that of the origin and nature of consciousness, let us
quote Dehaene and Naccache (2001) assessment of the
fundamental issues at stake there: ‘‘A complete theory of
consciousness should explain (..) what is the range of
possible conscious contents, how they map into specific
neural circuits, and whether a generic neural mechanism
underlies all of them.’’ Although our work does not
specifically address these questions, our implementation of
the third level of animal awareness could still provide some
hints about the corresponding sequence of operations:
• potential conscious contents P might have first to be
memorized (or directly produced) in {P} via an lts or
some other equivalent process.
• a triggering event Q might then be required in order to
elicit the retrieval of {P}.
• the association of {P} and Q could finally be made
‘‘conscious’’ in R via an ltr or another equivalent,
possibly amplifying process.
The origin of consciousness could thus be found at the
level of processing that is shared with ‘‘representations of the
immediate external environment’’ (Morsella et al. 2015).
Furthermore, in accordance with empirical evidences
describing conscious information as being available in a
‘‘global workspace’’ (Baars 2005; Dehaene and Naccache
2001), our protocols associated with higher levels of animal
awareness require the broadcast of paths. This could lead to a
modeling of this global workspace through a serial stream of
consciousness (James 1890), whose synchronization with the
parallel streams relating perception and behaviors could fol-
low from the introduction of a global clock.
Conclusion
In summary, as suggested in the introduction, the analytical
methods that are used today in computational neuroscience
could be complemented with discrete processes aggregating
lower level continuous processes in order to relate perception
and behavior. Whereas it seems reasonable to consider that at
the lower levels there may be valid physical theories, the
interaction between higher levels could be described using
computer science and/or information systems methods and
thus benefit from the results obtained in these domains.
With regard now to a possible ‘‘what next?’’ question, it
would be interesting to find out which new constructs, if any,
should be added to the present formalism in order to go
beyond perceptual categorization e.g., to implement the fourth
and fifth levels of animal awareness depicted in (Pepperberg
and Lynn 2000). If indeed, as speculated in (Carew 2002;
Poggio 2012) and supported by the models presented above,
‘‘classical and operand conditioning have in common, an
exciting principle might emerge: evolution may have come
up with a neural ‘associative cassette’ that can be used in
either type of conditioning, depending of the neural circuit in
which it is embedded’’. In other terms, the lts/ltr pair
might be a candidate for the role of the canonical microcircuit
looked for in (Modha et al. 2011). Finally yet, if ltp/ltd
threads have been explained at the light of the so-called spike-
time dependent plasticity, or STDP (Markram et al. 1997;
Brette et al. 2007), their extension into hypothetical lts/
ltr threads raises the issue of their possible grounding into
actual biological processes.
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Appendix: Virtual machine instructions
Model(Stream)(P(|X)).(T:fire(Q(|Y))):-              thread P(|X) fires thread Q(|Y)
      T1 is T+1, 
      set(Model(Stream)(Q(|Y)),clock(1)),           set Q(|Y) clock
      set(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),clock(T1)).          set P(|X) clock
Model(Stream)(P(|X)).(T:end):-                      thread P(|X) ends
      remove(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),clock(T)).        remove clock 
Model(Stream)(P(|X)).(T:send(Q(|Y))):-            thread P(|X) sends signal to thread Q(|Y)
      T1 is T+1, 
      if_not(ist(Model(Stream)(Q(|Y)),clock(_)),    receiver not active
      then((set(Model(Stream)(Q(|Y)),clock(1))))),  set receiver clock
      if_not(ist(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(W)),            no attached weight
      then(if(ist(Model(Stream),initial(P(|X),Q(|Y))(W)),             declared weight
           then(set(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(W))),        set declared weight
           else(set(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(0)))))),       set inhibit weight
      if_not(ist(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),signal(send(Q(|Y)))),            no send signal
      then(insert(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),signal(send(Q(|Y)))))),      queue send signal
      set(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),clock(T1)).          set sender clock
Model(Stream)(Q(|Y)).(T:receive(P(|X))):-      thread Q(|Y) receives signal from thread P(|X)
      T1 is T+1, 
      if(ist(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),signal(send(Q(|Y)))),                sender signal
      then(if((ist(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(K)),K>0),           excite level
           then(set(Model(Stream)(Q(|Y)),clock(T1)))))).            set receiver clock
Model(Stream)(P(|X)).(T:merge(Q(|Y))):-             thread P(|X) merges with thread Q(|Y)
      T1 is T+1, 
      if_not(ist(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),signal(merge(Q(|Y))))          no merge signal
      then(insert(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),signal(merge(Q(|Y)))))),    queue merge signal
      set(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),clock(T1)).          set clock
Model(Stream)(Q(|Y)).(T:join(P(|X))):-              thread Q(|Y) joins thread P(|X)
      T1 is T+1, 
      if(ist(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),signal(merge(Q(|Y)))),                merge signal
      then(set(Model(Stream)(Q(|Y)),clock(T1)))).   set clock
Model(Stream)(P(|X)).(T:push(Q)):-                  push stm record Q
      T1 is T+1, 
      remove(Model(Stream)(stm(_)),path),           remove path to stm
      remove(Model(Stream)(stm(_)),clock(_)),       remove stm clock
      set(Model(Stream)(stm(Q)),clock(1)),          set stm clock
      set(Model(Stream),weight(Q,stm(Q))(1)),       set excite weight
      set(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),clock(T1)) .         set clock
Model(Stream)(P(|X)).(T:pull(Q)) :-                 pull stm record Q
      T1 is T+1, 
      if(ist(Model(_)(stm(Q)),path),                global path to stm
      then(set(Model(Stream)(P(|X)),clock(T1)))).   set clock
Model(Stream)(lts(P(|X))).(T:store(P(|X))) :-       store ltm record P(|X)
      T1 is T+1, 
      if_not(ist(Model(Stream)(ltm(P(|X))),clock(_)),              ltm(P|X) not active
      then((set(Model(Stream)(ltm(P(|X))),clock(1)), set ltm clock
            if_not(ist(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),ltm(P(|X)))(W)),   set inhibit weight
            then(set(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),ltm(P(|X)))(0))))))), 
      set(Model(Stream)(lts(P(|X))),clock(T1)).     set lts clock
Model(Stream)(ltr(P(|X),Q(|Y),R(|Z))).(T:retrieve(P(|X))) :-         retrieve from ltm
      T1 is T+1, 
      if(ist(Model(_)(ltm(P(|X))),path),            global path to ltm
      then(set(Model(Stream)(ltr(P(|X),Q(|Y),R(|Z))),clock(T1)))).       set ltr clock
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Model(Stream)(P(Q)).(T:feed(_)) :-                                   feed path to P(Q)
      T1 is T+1, 
      if((ist(Model(Stream),weight(Q,P(Q))(K)),K>0), excite weight
      then((if_not(ist(Model(Stream)(P(Q)),path),   no path
            then(insert(Model(Stream)(P(Q)),path))), queue path
            set(Model(Stream)(P(Q)),clock(T1))))).  set clock 
Model(Stream)(Thread).(T:increment(weight(P(|X),Q(|Y)))) :-          increment weight
      T1 is T+1, 
      if((ist(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(W)),W<1),       weight below threshold
      then((W1 is W+1,                              increment weight
            set(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(W1))))),                set weight
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),clock(T1)).         set clock
Model(Stream)(Thread).(T:decrement(weight(P(|X),Q(|Y)))) :-         decrement weight
      T1 is T+1, 
      if((ist(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(W)),W>0),       weight above threshold
      then((W1 is W-1,                              decrement weight
            set(Model(Stream),weight(P(|X),Q(|Y))(W1))))),                set weight
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),clock(T1)).         set clock
Model(Stream)(Thread).(T:choice(X)):-               random selection in list X
      T1 is T+1, 
      random(R,X),                                  random choice R
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),fetch(R)),          set fetch stimulus
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),clock(T1)).         set clock
Model(Stream)(Thread).(T:test(Accept(|X))):-        test accept element
      T1 is T+1, 
      if(setof(Y,ist(Model(Stream),Accept(|Y)),List),           list of accepted elements
      then(if(member(X,List),                       element X in list
           then(set(Model(Stream)(Thread),excite(Accept(|X)))),     set excite stimulus
           else(set(Model(Stream)(Thread),inhibit(Accept(|X))))))   set inhibit stimulus
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),clock(T1)).         set clock
Model(Stream)(Thread).(T:transmit(X|Y)):-           noisy transmission of X conditional to Y
      T1 is T+1, 
      random(R,[X,Y]),                              weighted random choice
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),catch(R)),          set catch stimulus
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),clock(T1)).         set clock
Model(Stream)(Thread).(T:effector(P)):-             virtual effector
      T1 is T+1, 
      nl,write('>>'),write(effector(P)),nl, 
      set(Model(Stream)(Thread),clock(T1)).         set clock
Basic threads implementing synaptic plasticity and memory
threads(Model): 
[thread(ltp(Q,R),                                   long term potentiation
  [join(Q), 
   increment(weight(Q,R))]), 
 thread(ltd(Q,R),                                   long term depression
  [join(Q), 
   decrement(weight(Q,R))]), 
 thread(lts(P),                                     long term storage
  [store(P), 
   increment(weight(P,ltm(P)))]), 
 thread(ltr(P,Q,R), ),                              long term retrieval
  [retrieve(P), 
   increment(weight(Q,R))]), 
 thread(ltm(P), ),                                  long term memory
  [feed(_)]), 
 thread(stm(P), ),                                   short term memory
  [feed(_)])].
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